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Economic development is an uneven process, characterized by severe inequalities
in growth patterns across sectors and across space (Harris, 1985). Theories of
structural change typically explain the shift from agriculture to manufacturing
and services that accompanies the development process as being triggered by in-
creases in agricultural productivity ("push"), manufacturing productivity ("pull")
or a combination of both (for an overview of the literature, see Matsuyama, 2008).
This paper contributes to the literature by demonstrating that, even in the ab-
sence of technological progress, asymmetric sectoral output growth and employ-
ment shifts can be induced by trade. Such shifts result in spatial disparities in
economic activity that are qualitatively similar to those conventionally associated
with rural transformation. By highlighting the possible role of preferences as part
of the explanation for these disparities, the paper also aims to contribute to the
New Economic Geography literature (see Krugman, 1998, for an overview of this
literature).
To demonstrate these e⁄ects, we use a simple theoretical model to analyze the
e⁄ects of market integration on food and non-food production and the sectoral
composition of employment in a poor rural setting, where utility is highly sensitive
to food consumption. Our motivation for focusing on poor rural areas is twofold.
At the inception of the industrial revolution, most societies were rather poor and
dominated by agriculture. Currently, diversi￿cation beyond agriculture is often
considered a promising way out of poverty for poor rural economies. Yet, in
many countries, market fragmentation constrains the growth of the rural non-
farm sector (see e.g. Loening et al, 2008). If people cannot trade, they have
no choice but to produce what they need to eat.1 We analyze the bene￿ts of
1See e.g. de Janvry et al. (1991) for an analysis of peasant household behaviour when markets
1market integration and show that, under certain plausible assumptions, as trade
is facilitated, output and employment in the non-food sector grow more quickly
than output and employment in the food sector as trade. Sectoral growth patterns
are thus asymmetric. A related result is that the non-farm sector may bene￿t more
from market integration than the farm sector.
2 The Model
We consider a setting in which there are two representative agents (communities)
who are potential trading partners. We assume they produce, and consume, food
















NF denote consumption of food and non-food products, respectively,
for agent i, and a is a preference parameter bounded between 0 and 1. In rural
areas of developing countries, where poverty is widespread and a substantial pro-
portion of the population is malnourished, we think of a as being closer to 1 than
0, re￿ ecting a relatively high sensitivity of utility to changes in food consump-
tion.2 Each producer has a vector of product-speci￿c productive skills denoted
(Ai
F;Ai




NFi = (1 ￿ ￿i)A
i
NF;
where ￿i is the time (bounded between 0 and 1) agent i allocates to food pro-
duction, which we shall refer to as the employment share of sector i. Thus there
are missing.
2Dasgupta and Ray (1986; 1987) discuss how physical wellbeing is highly sensitive to changes
in nutritional intake at low nutrition levels, in their analysis of the e⁄ects of inequality on
malnutrition. Private consumption expenditure on food accounts for the bulk of consumer
spending in the least developed countries (Grigg, 1994).
2are constant returns to scale in both sectors.
Under autarky, each agent has to produce the products to be consumed. It is
straightforward to show that, in our model, the optimal amount of time allocated
to producing food in autarky is ￿i = a. Thus, if the preference parameter a is
high, each agent will allocate most of his or her time producing food, independent
of the underlying skills vector (Ai
F;Ai
NF).
Now consider the e⁄ects of integrating the market, enabling the two producers
to trade with each other. Suppose that community 1 has a comparative advantage










This assumption is maintained throughout the analysis. We assume that the
agents bargain over the total utility surplus generated by trade. The outside option











is maximized with respect to inputs ￿1;￿2. The solutions for ￿1;￿2 are summa-
rized in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 Optimal time allocation under trade is determined by preferences
and productivity di⁄erentials as follows:
1. If A1
F=A2
F < a=(1 ￿ a), then
￿1 = 1;


















NF > a=(1 ￿ a); then










Proof: See Appendix. Clearly, small changes in preferences can result in
sharply discontinous patterns of spatial specialization, as preferences a are a key
determinant of which solution will be optimal and thus of the sectoral composition
of employment across communities.
3 Application: A poor rural economy
Subject to the assumptions made, the results summarized in Proposition 1 are
general. In the context of a poor rural economy, it seems reasonable to assume that
utility is quite sensitive to food consumption (a close to 1), and that heterogeneity
in productivity levels (skills) across agents is modest (A1
F=A2
F close to 1). We thus
focus on the solution scenario where A1
F=A2
F < a=(1 ￿ a). It then follows from
Proposition 1 that, under trade, community 1 will specialize in food production
while community 2 will adopt a mixed production strategy. Now consider some
implications for output and sectoral employment shares under this scenario.
E⁄ects of shifting from autarky to trade on output. We highlight two
striking results. The ￿rst is that total volume of food produced is the same under









































Total consumption of food will thus not change as a result of market integration.
The second result is that total volume of non-food produced is strictly higher
under trade than under autarky:



































































NF > 1 measures the comparative advantage of community 1 in
food production. Thus, subject to A1
F=A2
F < a=(1 ￿ a), the more pronounced
the comparative advantage in agriculture for community 1, and the higher the
relative non-food productivity of community 1 to that of community 2, the higher
the output gain from trade in the non-food sector. This e⁄ect arises because
the increase in the relative e¢ ciency with which non-food is produced resulting
from trade exceeds the increase in the e¢ ciency with which non-food goods are
produced.
5Shifting from autarky to trade thus results in asymmetric growth: food output
does not change; non-food output increases.
E⁄ects of shifting from autarky to trade on sectoral employment shares.
The e⁄ects on sectoral employment shares depend on absolute advantages. It
follows from part 1 in Proposition 1 that if community 1 has an absolute advantage
in food production, i.e. A1
F=A2
F > 1, total employment in agriculture in the
economy falls, and total non-farm employment increases. Conversely, if A1
F=A2
F <
1 (agent 1 has an absolute disadvantage in food production), total employment
in agriculture in the economy increases, and total employment in the non-farm
sector falls. If A1
F=A2
F = 1, there is no change in employment in the agricultural
vs the non-farm sector.
Both the increase in non-farm output and the increase in the employment in
the non-farm sector are consistent with historically documented patterns of rural
transformation. Also note that the average productivity with which both farm
and non-farm goods are produced rises.
3.1 A numerical example
We now illustrate these e⁄ects by means of a simple numerical example. Suppose
A1
F = 0:6, A1
NF = 0:4, A2
F = 0:4, A1
NF = 0:6;a = 0:8. Community 1 thus has a
comparative (and absolute) advantage in the production of food, and community 2
a comparative (and absolute) advantage in the production of the non-food product.
In autarky, we have ￿i = 0:8 for i = 1;2, hence total production is as follows:
FAutarky = F1 + F2 = 0:8 ￿ (0:6 + 0:4) = 0:8;
NFAutarky = NF1 + NF2 = 0:2 ￿ (0:4 + 0:6) = 0:2
6Once the communities are allowed to trade, we obtain ￿1 = 1 and ￿2 = a ￿
(1￿a)(A1
F=A2
F) in equilibrium (see proposition 1). In this particular example, we
obtain ￿2 = 0:5. The total output volume in equilibrium is as follows:
F = F1 + F2 = 1 ￿ 0:6 + 0:5 ￿ 0:4 = 0:8;
NF = NF1 + NF2 = 0 ￿ 0:4 + 0:5 ￿ 0:6 = 0:3:
Thus, as a result of allowing the agents to trade with each other, the volume
of non-food products grows by 50%, whereas the volume of food products does
not change at all. Furthermore, since in this example A1
F=A2
F > 1, more labor is
allocated to non-food production and less is allocated to food production.
These e⁄ects are depicted in Figure 1. The solid straight lines indicate the pro-
duction possibility curves for the two agents, under autarky, and the indi⁄erence
curves are drawn for the Cobb-Douglas utility function with a = 0:8. Optimal
production and consumption in autarky for producers 1 and 2 are indicated in
the graph by the hollow small circle, and the hollow small diamond, respectively.
Once the agents engage in trade, the solution to the bargaining problem is such
that production occurs in the points indicated by the solid large circle for producer
1, and the solid large diamond for producer 2. The terms of trade are determined
as part of the bargaining process, and are shown in the graph by the gray dashed
lines. Producer 1 thus consumes in the point indicated by the solid small circle,
and producer 2 consumes in the point indicated by the small solid diamond. Both
agents increase their consumption of nonfarm goods, and so total production of
nonfarm products increases. The total level of food production and consumption
is unchanged compared to autarky.
73.2 Generalized preferences
The above results are obtained under the assumption that the utility function is
Cobb-Douglas. In cases where the elasticity of substitution is di⁄erent from 1,
the results will be di⁄erent. Given our context, the substitutability between food
and non-food products is probably rather limited. In the extreme case where the
elasticity of substitution is zero (Leontief utility function), so that the ratio of
food to non-food products consumed in equilibrium is constant, output in the two
sectors will always grow at the same rate when shifting from autarky to trade.

























where r = (s ￿ 1)=s and s is the elasticity of substitution. Suppose s = 0:5, so
that there is some substitutability, but less than under Cobb-Douglas preferences.
Using the same calibration as in the numerical example based on Cobb-Douglas
preferences above, we then solve numerically for the e⁄ects of trade on output.
We ￿nd that total food production grows by 5% (cf. 0% under Cobb-Douglas),
and that non-food output grows by 30% (cf. 50% under Cobb-Douglas). Thus,
there is still asymmetric growth - the non-farm sector grows more quickly - but,
this is less pronounced than under Cobb-Douglas preferences. For completeness
we also consider s = 2, implying high substitutability between the two products
(of course, it seems unlikely that individuals in a poor rural economy are willing
to substitute food for non-food consumption at such a rapid rate). In this case.
the volume of food produced falls by 10%, whereas non-food production grows by
85%, when the economy shifts from autarky to trade.
84 Discussion
Our model is highly stylized. However, some of the mechanisms that we have
abstracted from might enhance our results further. For example, Engel e⁄ects,
(which are often emphasized in the literature on structural change, see e.g. Mat-
suyama, 1992, Laitner, 2000, Caselli and Coleman, 2001) are likely to reinforce
our results; if one of the e⁄ects of market integration is to raise individuals￿in-
comes and this in turn lowers the food preference parameter a (an Engel e⁄ect)3,
then this will enhance the pattern of asymmetric growth in non-farm production
















+ (1 ￿ a)lnC
i
NF;
where S is the subsistence level of food consumption. It is easy to verify that this
speci￿cation would only reinforce our ￿nding that trade stimulates the output of
non-farm products and non-farm employment disproportionately (given reasonable
choices of S). If in the numerical example above S = 0:35, the time allocation of
producer 2 under autarky will change towards more production of food. The e⁄ect
of trade on total non-food production and non-farm employment will therefore be
even greater than with conventional preferences.
Increasing returns to scale (Romer, 1987, Krugman, 1991), endogenous techno-
logical progress (Matsuyama, 1992), knowledge spillovers, pecuniary externatlities
and other agglomeration economies are also likely to be important drivers of struc-
tural change (see e.g. WDR 2009 and the references therein for an overview of
agglomeration economies). The contribution of our analysis is to show that, even
3That Engel-e⁄ects cancontribute to asymmetric sectoral growth rates is well-known - see
e.g. Caselli & Coleman (2001), Matsuyama (1992), and Laitner (2000).
9in the absence of such auxiliary mechanisms which are probably very important
in practice, trade could result in asymmetric sectoral output growth as well as
employment shifts, and that small changes in preferences can result in sharply
discontinuous patterns of spatial specialization. Since facilitating trade is likely
to bene￿t the non-farm sector most, market integration appears an e⁄ective way
of catalyzing economic development in economies dominated by agriculture, i.e.
much of the developing world.
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Appendix
A1. Optimal time allocation under autarky. Individual i chooses the time
















subject to 0 ￿ ￿i ￿ 1. The Cobb-Douglas functional form implies that corner











which implies a = ￿i:










is maximized with respect to inputs ￿1;￿2; subject to
0 ￿ ￿i ￿ 1;i = 1;2: (1)
The resulting utility sharing rule implies:
U1 ￿ U1 = U2 ￿ U2:
Since the threat points U1;U2 are ￿xed, the time allocation parameters ￿1;￿2 will
be chosen in order to maximise total utility:
V = max
￿1;￿2
[U (F1 (￿1;￿2);NF1 (￿1;￿2)) + U (F2 (￿1;￿2);NF2 (￿1;￿2))];
where Fi;NFi denote food and non-food consumption for producers i = 1;2: Let
F;NF denote total food and non-food production:





NF = NF1 + NF2 = (1 ￿ ￿1)A
1
NF + (1 ￿ ￿2)A
2
NF:












hence F1=NF1 = F2=NF2 = F=NF. It follows that producer i will consume the
same share of total food production as of total non-food production:
12F1 = ￿F;
NF1 = ￿NF;
F2 = (1 ￿ ￿)F;
NF2 = (1 ￿ ￿)NF;
where ￿ is determined by the bargaining process. The utility maximization prob-
lem therefore simpli￿es to
V = max
￿1;￿2
[U (￿F (￿1;￿2);￿NF (￿1;￿2)) + U ((1 ￿ ￿)F (￿1;￿2);(1 ￿ ￿)NF (￿1;￿2))];
V = max
￿1;￿2
[(￿ + (1 ￿ ￿))U (F (￿1;￿2);NF (￿1;￿2))];
V = max
￿1;￿2
[U (F (￿1;￿2);NF (￿1;￿2))];






















A2.1 Types of solutions. The following table is useful for characterizing
the types of solutions to the maximization problem above
Table A1 - Types of solutions
￿1 = 0 0 < ￿1 < 1 ￿1 = 1
￿2 = 0 A g h
0 < ￿2 < 1 B F i
￿2 = 1 C D E










13It can then be seen immediately that the solutions A,C,E can never be optimal:
A & E result in zero consumption of one of the goods and so are inadmissible;
and C is always inferior to h. In what follows we ￿rst prove that B,F,D can
never be optimal, leaving us with three types of solutions: g,h,i. We then derive
the conditions determining which of the types g,h,i will be the optimal solution,
depending on skills and preferences.
A2.2 Optimal ￿2, conditional on ￿1 Suppose the solution for ￿2 is inte-























































































































































14Total non-food consumption is equal to




















NF = (1 ￿ ￿1)A
1
NF + (1 ￿ a)A
2
NF ￿ a(1 ￿ ￿1)A
1








NF = (1 ￿ ￿1)(1 ￿ a)A
1
NF + (1 ￿ a)A
2


























(1 ￿ ￿1)(1 ￿ a)A
1
NF + (1 ￿ a)A
2













































































































is the ratio of the relative food-productivity of individual 1 to that of individual 2.
All terms on the right-hand side of (3) are non-negative. It follows that utility is
a monotonic function of ￿1, which implies the solution for ￿1 is a corner solution
(specialization) whenever the solution for ￿2 is interior. This implies F in Table
A1 cannot be optimal. It also follows that R determines whether dlnV
d￿1 is positive
or negative, i.e. whether ￿1 will be equal to one or zero:
￿1 = 1 if R > 1
￿1 = 0 if R < 1:
15Hence, if producer 1 has a comparative advantage in food production, B in Table
A1 cannot be optimal. A corollary is that, if ￿1 is interior, then ￿2 must be a
corner solution, and since producer 2 has a comparative advantage in non-food
production, ￿2 = 0 must be the solution in this case; hence D cannot be optimal.
A2.3 Distinguishing between potential solutions The optimal solution
will be such that it falls into one of the cells g,h,i shown in Table A2:
Table A2 - Remaining solutions
0 < ￿1 < 1 ￿1 = 1
￿2 = 0 g h
0 < ￿2 < 1 Not optimal i
In regime i, we have
￿1 = 1


















In regime g, we have






























16￿ If (4) holds then (5) does not hold.
￿ If (5) holds then (4) does not hold.














In this case, neither g nor i can be optimal, leaving h (complete specialization) as
the only remaining candidate solution.
This completes the proof of Proposition 1 in the text.
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Non-farm product: Production & consumption
 
Note: The solid straight lines indicate the production possibility curves for the two hypothetical 
individuals discussed in the text, under autarky. The indifference curves are drawn for the Cobb 
Douglas utility function discussed in the text, with a = 0.8. Optimal production and consumption 
in autarky for individual 1 and 2 is indicated by the hollow small circle, and the hollow small 
diamond,  respectively.  Once  the  individuals  engage  in  trade,  the  solution  to  the  bargaining 
problem  is  such  that  production  occurs  in  the  points  indicated  by  the  solid  large  circle  for 
individual 1, and the solid large diamond for individual 2. Individual 1 consumes in the point 
indicated by the solid small circle, and individual 2 consumes in the point indicated by the small 
solid  diamond.  The  terms  of  trade  are  indicated  by  the  gray  dashed  lines.  Both  individuals 
increase their consumption of nonfarm goods.  
 